Wednesday, October 08, 2003

Do you really expect the Semantic Web to educate fools? 

Somehow these "fools" always turn out to be our brothers and sisters,
mothers and fathers, sons and daughters, friends and family - even me.
Automobile manufacturers were finally required to provide seatbelts
and airbags to protect the "fools" that drive recklessly and to
protect us from them. I suspect they objected at first, saying things
like "Its not cars that cause accidents, its the fools who drive them
carelessly that kill people. You'll cripple transportation if you ask
us to get involved in these problems."

There's another argument made that considerations of such
problems and any solutions to them don't belong in the architecture.
In the past, buildings were designed without regard for earthquakes.
Over the years, thousands of people died. Now building architects
build defenses against earthquakes into the architecture from the
start.

Its also suggested that we don't know enough about what the Semantic
Web will become to act now. I thought of this argument this morning
as I was driving to work in an intense fog that comes over Northern
Virginia sometimes. When my visibility is reduced, and I can't see
what dangers lie ahead, I tend to become more cautious and alert,
rather than less. So why does the uncertainty of direction of the
Semantic Web argue for doing nothing? Are we hoping that if we
just keep quiet and leave it up to government and lawyers, maybe
they won't come back and ask us, "Hey. Can't you do something
technological about this? something like quake-proof buildings
or automobiles with airbags?"

There seems to be a sense in society that the makers of products
should think about these things. Is the Semantic Web different? Are
sw-agents products? If not, what are they? Are they beings, endowed
by their creators with inalienable rights? Do they have first amendment
rights? Someone's going to think and act on these questions. Why not
us, here, now?

Monday, October 06, 2003

The Webmaster and the Logician 

To a Logician, the URIs used as logical constants to denote entities are deliberately minimal symbols. So are the entities they refer to. One might compare the entities they refer to to points in a volume of space in that each has position but takes up no space. You can label this position, to give you a logical constant to refer to it in statements, but this label could be from any number of systems of names, in any language, including a URI. These labels name the points referred to in an interpretation of the model. They make up the universe of discourse. Like patterns formed of pinpricks of starlight, what really matters are the constellations formed in these spaces by statements in the language. These are investigated by swapping in different sets of points to find out if the constellations shape holds with all possible sets of points. It is good and proper for a Logician to use URIs to do this.

To a Webmaster, URIs are weighty things. Some URIs have great economic value. Domain names are bought and sold, sometimes for millions of dollars. URIs are torn down and built up character by character with great care by armies of programmers. Some are old, nearing a decade in age, still referring to basically the same site. Individuals and organizations form deep attachments to URIs. Firewalls are built and lawsuits are filed to protect their use. These URIs refer to entities like planets teeming with all forms of life. The URIs themselves feel more like flags or coats of arms denoting the riches of kingdoms than mere labels. It is good and proper for the Webmaster to use URIs like this.

So the Webmaster and the Logician have different feelings when working with RDF. The Webmaster, though eager to acquire the tools that the Logician promises to build, sometimes gets a little nervous about the fast and loose treatment of URIs he sees. Often he can't help but feel a bit insulted by the lack of respect shown URIs. The Logician, for his part, gets annoyed at the sentimentality he perceives in the Webmaster, and chides him for standing in the way of progress. As the work of the Logician progresses towards completion, the Webmaster may start feeling a little panicky.

The Webmaster may say, "Enough with the swapping in and out interpretations. You've done your investigations, you have forms that are true and valid in all possible interpretations, but don't forget why we commissioned you in the first place. It's time to apply this machinery to the Web of existing URIs. Its time to build an application of RDF by investigating what happens if we all agree on this single interpretation where each URI in RDF denotes a real URI from this existing universe of URIs. You agreed this could be done during the Joust in July. So its time to get your head out of the stars and remember we're engineers building a real world application."

The Logician might then pull back indignantly, "No. I can't let my work be constrained like that. You'll remove it's generality, it's power. Don't get timid and plebian now. You've done a great thing to have us build our edifice, and it can be used in your world. But it can do so much more if you just don't cripple it by constraining it to a single interpretation.

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Prior Art

Socrates

"We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form in the case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name. Do you not understand?" "I do." "In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; for example, there are many couches and tables." "Of course." "But these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or forms, one of a couch and one of a table." "Yes." "And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other the tables that we use, and similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he?" "By no means."
Plato, Republic X, page 596a


David Hume

"This convention is not of the nature of a promise: For even promises themselves, as we shall see afterwards, arise from human conventions. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be called a convention or agreement betwixt us, though without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are performed upon the supposition, that something is to be performed on the other part. Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, though they have never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less derived from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and. by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it. On the contrary, this experience assures us still more, that the sense of interest has become common to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future regularity of their conduct: And it is only on the expectation of this, that our moderation and abstinence are founded. In like manner are languages gradually established by human conventions without any promise. ..." - A Treatise of Human Nature, Chapter 74 by David Hume


John Locke

"...Semeiotike, or the doctrine of signs; the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also Logike, logic: the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For, since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas. And because the scene of ideas that makes one man's thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor laid up anywhere but in the memory, a no very sure repository: therefore to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary: those which men have found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are articulate sounds. The consideration, then, of ideas and words as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with." - AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING by John Locke 1690