Monday, December 27, 2004

Real World Semantics 

More from Andrew D.M. Smith's PhD Thesis. "In this chapter, I have reviewed many recent simulations of the evolution of language, paying particular attention to their models of meaning representation and meaning creation. All of these models claim to have a ‘semantic’ meaning space, yet on closer inspection, the majority of the models had categories which were innate, pre-specified by the experimenters themselves, and had no reference to any external world at all." This sounds like the objection that Google has against human coded Metadata,"Also, it is interesting to note that metadata efforts have largely failed with web search engines, because any text on the page which is not directly represented to the user is abused to manipulate search engines. There are even numerous companies which specialize in manipulating search engines for profit." Humans often times add metadata that has no reference to the external world. It may be mistaken, incomplete, even deceptive. Google's keyword searches on the other hand are made against features that are actually extracted from the documents themselves. Smith continues, "Many of them, in addition, had no sense relations of even the most basic type; there were no relationships at all between one category and another, which were instead atomic, individual items." Sense relations are probably handled well by semantic web languages, OWL in particular. But as Smith says, "The meanings in these models are not under the control of the agents at all; only the experimenters themselves can create new meanings or delete obsolete ones, and the meanings can only appear or disappear from an agent’s repertoire by ‘magic’. In summary, the semantic models of many language evolution simulations are simply not semantic at all, but are instead merely a rudimentary coding system, which the agents in the experiments use as a template with which to decode items expressed in another medium, namely the signals." And this is true with most, if not all of the semantic web implementations I have seen. The agents are not doing anything semantic at all. The categories are not grounded in features of the world.

"On the other hand, there are a sizeable number of experimenters who have made an effort to incorporate some kind of realistic semantic systems, by including an external world of objects which the categories refer to, and by providing various different methods for creating meaning based on the agents’ experience in this world. Meaning creation in these models is based on the discrimination game, in which an agent’s task is to return a category which describes one particular object, distinguishing it from another set of objects. Experimenters have used both classical categorisation and prototype categorisation successfully for their semantic representations; both have advantages and disadvantages, but for the remainder of this thesis I will use my model of semantic representation and creation, which is explored in more detail in the next chapter."

I think these researchers are on the right track.

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Prior Art

Socrates

"We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form in the case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name. Do you not understand?" "I do." "In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; for example, there are many couches and tables." "Of course." "But these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or forms, one of a couch and one of a table." "Yes." "And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other the tables that we use, and similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he?" "By no means."
Plato, Republic X, page 596a


David Hume

"This convention is not of the nature of a promise: For even promises themselves, as we shall see afterwards, arise from human conventions. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be called a convention or agreement betwixt us, though without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are performed upon the supposition, that something is to be performed on the other part. Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, though they have never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less derived from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and. by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it. On the contrary, this experience assures us still more, that the sense of interest has become common to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future regularity of their conduct: And it is only on the expectation of this, that our moderation and abstinence are founded. In like manner are languages gradually established by human conventions without any promise. ..." - A Treatise of Human Nature, Chapter 74 by David Hume


John Locke

"...Semeiotike, or the doctrine of signs; the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also Logike, logic: the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For, since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas. And because the scene of ideas that makes one man's thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor laid up anywhere but in the memory, a no very sure repository: therefore to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary: those which men have found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are articulate sounds. The consideration, then, of ideas and words as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with." - AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING by John Locke 1690